

Venezuela vista desde lejos

Some reflections on self-management and co-management

*Emma Miriam Yin-Hang To**

RESUMEN

En contra de la lógica del neoliberalismo, el gobierno actual de Venezuela ha presentado la autogestión y la cogestión como dos instrumentos principales para trascender las relaciones capitalistas de producción hacia la meta del “socialismo del siglo veintiuno”. Este trabajo reflexiona sobre algunas de las perspectivas de la izquierda anglohablante acerca de las contradicciones existentes entre las metas del gobierno chavista respecto de la transformación socialista a partir de la autogestión y la cogestión, y los problemas asociados a la aplicación práctica de ésta. Específicamente, este trabajo se enfoca en los problemas respecto de la suposición de que las estrategias “desde arriba” y “desde abajo” son mutuamente excluyentes.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Venezuela, socialismo, autogestión, cogestión, izquierda anglohablante, desde arriba, desde abajo.

ABSTRACT

In rejection of the “neoliberal” market practice, self-managed cooperatives and co-managed enterprises have been projected as two key vehicles for transcending capitalist relations of production in the current Venezuelan government’s goal towards “socialism of the twenty-first century”. This paper reflects on some of the English-speaking Left’s perspectives on the tensions between the Chávez government’s projections of socialist transformation through cooperatives and co-management, and the problems associated with their application in practice. In particular, it focuses on the problems of posing “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches as mutually exclusive.

KEY WORDS: Venezuela, socialism, self-management, co-management, English-speaking Left, top-down, bottom-up.

* Departamento de Economía Política, Universidad de Sídney.

In rejection of the “neoliberal” market practice, self-managed cooperatives and co-managed enterprises have been projected as two key vehicles for transcending capitalist relations of production in the current Venezuelan government’s goal towards “socialism in the twenty-first century”. This paper will reflect on some outside perspectives on the tensions between the Chávez government’s projections of socialist transformation through cooperatives and co-management, and the problems associated with their application in practice.

INTRODUCTION

The analytical frameworks from which much of the English-speaking left reflect on current processes in Latin America can be broadly defined by two distinct poles with little movement in between. The first pole consists of a largely state-centric approach focused on the Party as the prioritized agent in social change which in the process objectifies grass roots agency and in particular, “working class” agency (Woods, 2005). The second pole explicitly refuses to engage with the state and political organizations. It purely focuses on agency of all subjects, working class or otherwise (Dangl, 2010; Holloway, 2003; Motta, 2009). Both approaches appear to lack a grounded approach in reflecting on the challenge of implementing principles of solidarity and communalism in all aspects of worker-management in the macroeconomic context. This paper seeks to both criticise the limitations of and draw out the relevant points from each of these approaches in reflecting on the problems and potential of worker-management in Venezuela by engaging with a political economy analysis from a socialist humanist perspective (Lebowitz, 2003; Lebowitz, 2010; Thompson, 1968).

The paper is divided into four sequential conceptual areas. Firstly, the false dichotomy of analyzing current social and political processes as either old movements versus new social movements, or state-centric Marxism versus “autonomist” Marxism. Secondly, the problem of worker-management strategies targeting production but not exchange. Thirdly, the challenge of thinking collectively. Lastly, the conceptual links between the second and third sections.

OLD MOVEMENTS VS. NEW MOVEMENTS –A FALSE DICHOTOMY

At the first pole is positivist political science, which takes the state and other social forms for granted. This pole generally includes caricatures of “Marxism” as economically deterministic and purely focused on structure (i.e. forces of production) rather than agency (the social constitution of these forces of production) (Motta, 2009:33). This approach is often caricatured as being focused on building a political organisation with aspirations towards gaining political power in state institutions (Holloway, 2003:81-86, 91). Though the agency of workers is not neglected, the prioritized agent conceptually is the Party or other political organisations. The workers can never attain true consciousness as they are ultimately limited to the trade union consciousness of immediate circumstances. In terms of worker-management in Venezuela, this approach views the problems of corruption and self-interest in worker-management as attributed to a lack of consciousness which the institutions of the state can aid in teaching (Ellner, 2010:130).

The other pole moves away from the prioritized class category of “old movements” and away from the state as the site of transformation altogether (Holloway, 2003:91-96; Motta, 2009:34-35; Dangl, 2010). This approach champions disengagement with institutional actors as manifested in the struggle of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico. The premise of this mistrust of the state derives from the experience of soviet socialism (see discussion on Engels and Lukács in Holloway, 2003:13, 191; 93). In terms of worker-management in Venezuela, this approach views the problems of worker-management being attributed to the institutions of the state meddling in processes which should be left to workers’ agency alone (see interview with Orlando Chirinos in *El Libertario*, 2007a, 2007b; Barrios and Mendoza, 2010).

Although this approach is relevant in analyzing some of the challenges faced by social movements engaging with state institutions, it is too simplistic in framing a realistic analysis of cooperatives and co-management because clearly they are supported by the state in both positive and negative ways (see Piñero Harnecker, 2009; Barrios and Mendoza, 2010; Vera Colina, 2006; Azzellini, 2009). Moreover, this approach generalizes the

experience of soviet socialism to Latin America without accounting the uniqueness of the Latin American experience.

In my view, both these approaches are not directly applicable to Venezuela as they both tend to view social and political processes as occurring in a predicted manner of either top-down or bottom-up relations rather than viewing the relationship between the state and agency as a necessary contradiction. Moreover, these approaches lack a grounded framework through a lack of engagement with political economy. In this respect, the ideas of Venezuela-based Canadian Marxist economist Michael Lebowitz (2003; 2010) can provide a framework in synthesizing some of the relevant points from these approaches into a more holistic approach.

There are two significant and intertwined issues in relation to worker-management in Venezuela which a political economy analysis from a socialist humanist perspective can ground and sharpen the conceptual understanding of the two poles. Firstly, cooperatives and co-managed factories only target the production side of capitalist relations and not the exchange side of capitalist relations. Secondly, cooperatives and co-managed factories require workers to have a communalistic and solidaristic consciousness both within and beyond their communities.

MISSING STAGE IN THE CIRCUIT OF CAPITAL –SOCIALIZATION OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION BUT NOT THE MEANS OF EXCHANGE

Observing Marx's "circuit of capital", the tensions between workers and capital are present at each of the three stages (Lebowitz, 2003).¹ It is present in the assembly of inputs for production –the bidding for the price of labour power. It is present in the production process –the conditions of work. And it is present in selling the product –the

¹ The circuit of capital can be represented as $M-C...[P]...M'-C'$ where M = money, C = capital and P = production. The first stage is $M-C$ which requires the assembly of necessary inputs through the purchase of capital (constant and variable) with money. The second stage is the production process ($[P]$). The third stage is $M'-C'$ which represents the successful selling of commodities in the marketplace or the transformation of surplus value into profits.

tensions between depressing wages and increasing consumption. As such, class struggle –between labour and capital– is an integral dynamic of every stage of the circuit of capital.

Cooperatives and worker co-managed factories seek to replace the place of capital in the first two stages. However, they also only target the first two stages in the circuit of capital. They involve the replacement of capital as a mediator in all phases of the production process –purchase of labour power, in the direction and supervision of production and the ownership of the products of labour– but they do not transcend the logic of capital for “capital in circulation” (Lebowitz, 2003:88-89). Consequently, it does not account for the successful selling of products in the market –the exchange of commodities in the market. For cooperatives to survive, they still need to compete in the capitalist market and be financially viable through profit-making.

In terms of the first pole, a conceptual understanding of capitalist relations as organized around nation-states or political organisations focused on taking control of national state apparatuses is limited in that global capital is not constrained by national forms of regulation (Holloway, 2003:95-96). Cooperatives and worker co-managed factories are dependent on the central government for almost every phase of its operations. Most cooperatives and all co-managed factories are dependent on the government in providing market access or funding to maintain its costs of operations (Barrios and Mendoza, 2010:133-134; Wilpert, 2007:77-79). But the Venezuelan government in turn is constrained by its dependence on the oil industry and the oil industry’s dependence on global capital. This is reflected in the so-called “consensus” around not implementing worker-management in economically significant sectors such as the oil and telecommunications sectors.

In terms of the second pole, given that there is no global mode of regulation, it is a necessary contradiction for global capital to be regulated by nationally-based institutions. Some cooperatives have attempted to overcome their dependence on the Venezuelan government for market access by exporting their products internationally or selling their products to domestic capitalist intermediaries and distributors for a higher price (Dávila, 2007, cited in Piñeiro Harnecker, 2009:324). However, this has also been motivated by the higher prices not available in selling products

to the government supermarket chain *Mercal* which provides subsidized food to poor people. There is a clear tension between providing market access for cooperatives to make them financially viable, and the projection towards transcending the logic of capital. Despite the difficulties posed through dependence on a government that is constrained by the global structures of capital accumulation, the government nonetheless still has an important role to play in ensuring that exchange of commodities takes place in a socially orientated manner.

FORMACIÓN, CONSCIOUSNESS AND REVOLUTIONARY PRACTICE

Although many of the problems in cooperatives and co-managed factories do stem from a lack of consciousness with respect to the values of solidarity and communality on local and national levels, is it the role of state institutions to decide what is the “correct” attitude towards horizontal workplace management? Holloway’s (2003:81-86) critique of “Scientific Marxism” is relevant here because if the critical revolutionary subject does not arise from the grass roots, then it would have to arise from the political organisation of the Party and later the institutions of the state. The state-centred approach of the first pole is limited in that it assumes that workers are passive and thus contradicts the meaning of worker-management as the self-making agents that liberate themselves from the alienation in capitalist workplace relations. On the other hand, without any role for political organisations or institutions of the state, then where would resources come from for this practical activity that would lead to a change of consciousness that would in turn lead to de-alienated ways of thinking about workplace relations? Does the critical revolutionary subject just spontaneously arise from nowhere?

Clearly the *formación* of people isn’t either a question about possessing the “correct” consciousness or a question of agency without structure. People inherit a certain social heritage that informs the way they reproduce and contest social relations but it does not determine how they behave. Although unemployed and underemployed Venezuelans share the common experiences of social and economic marginalisation, simply sharing the same

economic position is not enough to inform class consciousness. Class consciousness is a necessary precursor to class agency (Thompson, 1968:11) –actively giving meaning to solidaristic and egalitarian principles both in the workplace and the wider community. Class consciousness is awareness of common social and economic circumstances and class agency is acting as that “class for itself” with those common social and economic experiences. As such, class is an active process –it is formed through specific historical relationships– and “owes as much to agency as to conditioning” (Thompson, 1968:9).

However, in the policies of cooperatives and co-management, there is the embedded assumption that by socialising the means of production, you will get workplace democracy (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2009; Steve Ellner, cited in *Venezuela: from the Inside Out*, 2008). Consequently, it posits a causal relationship between class position and class consciousness. Simply because the relations of production in cooperatives and worker co-managed factories have been democratised does not mean that people will act consciously as a “class for itself” –as a class conscious collective aware of their collective interests. As such, the policies assumed a causal relationship between class position and class consciousness.

Another problem with the cooperative policy was that the policy was implemented without significant community consultation about specific needs. In terms of the first pole, a state-centric approach is limited as it simply cannot superimpose abstract models or policies without consideration of the specific context. The cooperative policy was initially projected from the government as a policy to target unemployment, the informal economy and the dominance of the oil sector. Cooperatives were promoted as business models with more favorable loan conditions than individualistic hierarchal businesses that the government was encouraging poor people to form. The program that trained cooperative members, *Vuelvan Caras* (Return to face), was focused purely on vocational knowledge (Christine Dejong, cited in *Venezuela: Revolution from the Inside Out*, 2008). It did not address the specific aspects of how people were going to relate to each other in horizontal management and how the fruits of production were going to relate to community needs. Despite the values of solidarity and cooperation established in the Special Cooperative Law of

2001, the approach still assumed that aggregated self-interest would have positive outcomes—a notion that is remarkably similar to the teachings of Neoclassical economists (Kirman, 1992:117).

On the other hand, co-management was initiated by workers with government support coming later. The government's support for co-management was based on the need to ensure management loyalty in strategic industries in the context of the managerial strike in the state-owned oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, SA) in 2002 to 2003. Despite the ownership structure of 49 percent to workers and 51 percent to the government and the election of management by workers, the government has a conscious role in steering the political culture of workplace relations. In the case of the state expropriated aluminium plant ALCASA, one of the first co-management experiments, solidarian and communalistic principles are not being adopted by workers but rather are being adopted by management. This is in spite of the fact that management was elected by the workforce at the beginning of ALCASA's transformation into co-management.

In response to workers' concerns that they need to continue to work after their customary 20 years service to the company, management proposed a reduction of the working week to accommodate for workers wishing to stay on with ALCASA. Although management's position corresponds to the principles of solidarity and egalitarianism, the workers who have not completed their customary 20 years have rejected this proposal citing that their salaries would be reduced and overtime would be eliminated (*El Libertario*, 2007b). This needs to be put in context of the fact that entry level workers in ALCASA already earn three times the minimum wage while medium level workers earn six times the minimum wage. Consequently, workers still operate in an egoistic manner even in relation to their fellow co-workers.

In terms of the second pole, it does appear on the surface that it is a case of state institutions meddling in the decisions of workers thus contradicting the meaning of worker-management. Because there is no legal or constitutional mechanism for ensuring that the workers' decisions are respected, it is unclear how the co-management structure works in practice (Vera Colina, 2006). However, the sentiment that workers should not have to incorporate the needs of all workers is somewhat unjustified given

that the resources that created their co-managed enterprise came from the government in the first place and from not themselves. Nonetheless, despite operating in the workers' collective interests, the management of ALCASA is still acting in the interests of the central government rather than the workers.

There is a clear tension and necessary contradiction in the dynamic between the "top-down" state institutions and the 'bottom-up' agency of workers and the marginalized poor (Ellner, 2009). On the one hand, in the absence of government and state-owned oil sector in the first place, the resources for the co-management and cooperative policies would have never come about. On the other hand, whilst the central government has been crucial in making formal changes, the changes that have been woven into the social fabric have not taken place through the state but through day-to-day work from Chávez supporters in making these otherwise formal changes into reality (Fernandes, 2010). But how these changes are actually implemented in keeping with Venezuela's "natural elements" (Martí, 1981:117) is the difficult question.

Nonetheless, people as the protagonists of self-change cannot be viewed in isolation from the institutions of the state and other existing organisations that mediate and reinforce existing social relations. Clearly, a holistic approach needs to embrace the necessary contradictions between the state as a site of transformation and grass roots movements as the subjects of change, and the contradictions between both the old system and the new system struggling to survive (Lebowitz, 2010: 121).

CONTESTED REPRODUCTION –SOCIALIZATION AT ALL STAGES

Inverting the circuit of capital, Lebowitz looks at the process of socialist transition through the use of three interdependent elements –social ownership of production, socially orientated production and the production for communal needs (Lebowitz, 2010:24). Whilst social ownership of production is important, it cannot be evaluated in isolation from socially orientated production and the production for communal needs. Lebowitz looks at the issue of the "missing" stage in the circuit of capital

(exchange or the valorization of surplus value) by inverting it in terms of satisfying communal needs.

Although principles of solidarity and egalitarianism are the constitutional cornerstone of cooperatives and co-management, merely instituting horizontal workplace relations have shown that it does not in and of itself make people behave in a more socially conscious manner. The Venezuelan experience of cooperatives and co-management has demonstrated that people often still operate in a group capitalist manner (Steve Ellner, cited in *Venezuela: Revolution from the Inside Out*, 2008). Others have taken advantage of the cooperative model purely to escape tax obligations (Ellner, 2010:130; Piñero Harnecker, 2009). Moreover, horizontal workplace relations alone do not contradict the logic of capital (see lessons from Yugoslavia, Lebowitz, 2010:73-76; Lebowitz, 2005). As such, the initial policies from 2001 only referred to social ownership but not socially orientated production or communal needs.

To contradict the logic of capital or at least to subordinate capitalist relations somewhat, producers need to be aware of who they are producing for (Lebowitz, 2010:78-81). Workers need to recognise, not only, that capital² does not only take on an external existence in producing the fruits of their labour but also in how those fruits relate to the needs of others as a society. As pointed out by Istvan Mészáros (cited in Lebowitz, 2010:80), “the nature of *exchange* in the communal system of production and consumption [...] [is] its practical orientation towards the exchange of activities, and not of products”. Those activities need to be directed towards social needs on a collective basis, not only on a local level but also on a national and international level.

In terms of the first pole, the integration of social needs in production and exchange for cooperatives has since been addressed on several fronts by the government. Lending institutions have included “social clauses” in their conditions for granting credits and the government has put forward the new model of Social Production Enterprise (EPS) which must “privilege the values of solidarity, cooperation, complementarity, reciprocity, equity, and sustainability ahead of the value of profitability” (Decree of President

² Capital is no more than alienated and objectified labour.

Hugo Chávez, 2005). An enterprise must dedicate 10 percent of its net revenue to investments in a local community project to be considered an EPS. In 2007, the *Vuelvan Caras* program changed to the *Misión Che Guevara* (2010) to highlight the need for workers to adopt the principles of solidarity and communalism. Cooperatives have also been encouraged to integrate with communal councils³ to coordinate the needs of local communities.

In terms of co-management, to solve some of the philosophical conflicts on the fruits of production in ALCASA, management set up the Negro Primero Centre for Political and Social formation. The aim was to educate workers on the humanisation of labour in respects such as the reduction of the working day, the democratisation of knowledge to reduce the social division of labour within the factory and the decentralisation of decision making through construction of workers councils (Janicke, 2007).

Nonetheless, in terms of the second pole, cooperatives still face many barriers from local governments for their effective implementation. Sometimes cooperatives are cooperatives in name only and are essentially managed by the local government. Local governments such as governors and local municipalities are often the largest stakeholder in cooperatives (Mendoza and Barrios, 2010). As such, it is horizontal management formally but vertical management effectively meaning that the capitalist relations of production remain in place. Workers are effectively exploited by local government bureaucrats.

Conversely, where cooperatives are socially conscious and have contributed back to the local community through involvement in the communal councils, local governments sometimes assume credit for these projects (Ellner, 2009:7). This can be attributed to the need for local governments to appear as legitimate vehicles of the political process as the development of communal councils (incorporating cooperatives under this new structure) receives funding directly from the central government unlike previously where funding was

³ Communal councils are locally elected neighbourhood-based councils that develop policies and oversee them in the community. They were created in order for government funds to reach directly to local communities rather than through the bureaucracy of the pre-Chávez local government bodies.

received through the intermediary of local governments. As such, this has broken the dependence of community organisations on local governments. Local governments have the most to lose from the development of communal councils because “it would rule out clientilistic practices in which their followers receive jobs, contracts and other favours” (Ellner, 2009:7).

There are also cases where local governments actively impede the registration of particular cooperatives. The Perez Perez Delgado slaughterhouse cooperative in Ospino, the state of Lara, independently occupied their factory after stalled negotiations with private management. But the cooperative has found it very difficult to claim official recognition. This is in spite of the fact that they have received no loans from the government making them one of the few cooperatives who are not financially dependent on government funding. In addition, they have contributed significant portions of the production back to the community above the percentage for Social Production Enterprises (Barrios and Mendoza, 2010). The local government won't recognise them because the local mayor was the largest stakeholder in the former company that operated in the factory.

For co-management, the picture is rather different due to the involvement of the central government which provides fewer opportunities for opportunistic local government intervention. Rather, the tensions are between competing *chavista* unions and the workers' councils in the co-management structure which are heavily influenced by the central government. On the one hand, the workers' councils take power away from established unions who have traditionally monopolised institutions of labour and are couched in the clientilistic and bureaucratic apparatus of traditional political institutions. On the other hand, the introduction of workers' councils can also be interpreted as a means for consolidation of power in the central government. Orlando Chirinos from the Chávez government established UNT, National Union of Workers, has interpreted the workers' councils as a vehicle in the dismantling of the union movement (Interview with Orlando Chirinos, *El Libertario*, 2007a). There is a complex dynamic within the co-managed factories as workers are both influenced by traditional unions and the central government. The reality of co-management is that “workers' agency' is

filtered through some kind of organisational structure whether it is through workers' councils or traditional unions. As such, the second pole is limited as it dismisses the relevance of political organisations in understanding the complex and heterogeneous manifestations of agency.

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that a political economy analysis from a socialist humanist perspective (Lebowitz, 2003, 2010; Thompson, 1968) can aid in conceptualizing some of the challenges faced by cooperatives and co-management as vehicles of socialist transition. However, a holistic approach will still need to draw from the intellectual traditions from Latin America, and in particular Venezuela. The two poles are limited by their lack of conceptual analysis specific to Latin America but are still useful in analysing some common problems. The English speaking left need to broaden their analytical tools in reflecting on Venezuela and Latin America, specifically by engaging with different conceptual frameworks such as the different traditions within political economy and from Latin American thinkers.

REFERENCES

- Azzellini, D. (2009), "Economía solidaria, formas de propiedad colectiva, nacionalizaciones, empresas socialistas, co y autogestión en Venezuela", *Org & Dem, Marilia*, vol. 10, issue 1/2, diciembre 2009, pp. 5-30.
- Dangl, B. (2010), *Dancing with Dynamite: Social Movements and States in Latin America*, California, AK Press.
- Decree of President Hugo Chávez (2005), "Desarrollo endógeno y empresas de producción social", decree 3 895 of 2005, *Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela*, viewed on 15 October 2009 [www.edelca.com.ve/licitaciones/leyes/decreto3895.pdf].
- Ellner, S. (2009), "The 'Top-down' and 'Bottom-up' approach of the Chávez movement and government", 2009 Meeting of Latin American Studies Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 11-14.
- Ellner, S. (2010), *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict and the Chávez Phenomenon*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Fernandes, S. (2010), *Who can stop the drums?: urban social movements in Chávez's Venezuela*, Durham, Duke University Press.
- Holloway, J. (2003), *Change the world without taking power: the meaning of revolution today*, London, Pluto Press.
- Janicke, K. (2007), "Without Workers' Management There Can Be No Socialism", *Venezuelanalysis*, October 30, viewed on 15 October 2009 [<http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2784>].
- Kirman, Alan P. (1992), "Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 6, number 2 (Spring), pp. 117-136.
- Lebowitz, M. A. (2003), *Beyond Capital: Political Economy of the Working Class*, London, Palgrave MacMillan.
- Lebowitz, M.A (2005), "Constructing Co-Management in Venezuela: Contradictions along the Path", *Monthly Review*, viewed on 15 October 2009 [<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/lebowitz241005.html>].
- Lebowitz, M. A. (2010), *A Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development*, New York, Monthly Review Press.
- El Libertario* (2007a), "Entrevista con Orlando Chirinos de la Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT) y Coordinador de la Corriente Classista Unitaria Revolucionaria Autónoma (CCURA)", viewed on 15 October 2009 [www.nodo50.org/ellibertario/.../Entrevista%20a%20Orlando%20Chirinos.rtf].
- (2007b), "The Myth of 'Co-management' in Venezuela: Reflections on Alcasa and Invepal", number 51, viewed on 15 October 2009 [www.nodo50.org/ellibertario/english/The%20Myth%20of.doc].
- Martí, J. (1891), "Our America", in Shnookal, D. and Muñiz, M. (eds.), *José Martí Reader: Writings on the Americas*, Melbourne, Ocean Press, pp. 111-120.
- Martinez, C., Fox, M. and Farrell, J. (eds.) (2010), *Venezuela Speaks! Voices from the Grassroots*, California, PM Press.
- Mendoza, M. And Barrios, C. (2010), "Pedro Pérez Delgado Cooperative, Industrial Slaughterhouse of Ospino", in Martinez, C., Fox, M. And Farrell, J. (eds.) (2010), *Venezuela Speaks! Voices from the Grassroots*, California, PM Press.
- Misión Che Guevara (2010), "¿Qué es la misión Che Guevara?", viewed on 20 June 2010 [<http://www.misioncheguevara.gob.ve/contenido.php?id=219>].
- Motta, S. (2009), "Old Tools and New Movements in Latin America: Political Science as Gate Keeper or Political Illuminator?", *Latin American Politics and Society*, volume 51, Issue 1, pp. 31-56, Spring.

- Piñeiro Harnecker, C. (2009), "Workplace Democracy and Social Consciousness: A Study of Venezuelan Cooperatives", *Science and Society*, vol. 73, number 3, July, pp. 309-339.
- Thompson, E.P. (1968), *The Making of the English Working Class*, Middlesex, Pelican Books.
- Venezuela: Revolution from the Inside Out* (2008), Documentary, Headstands unlimited, distributed by PM Press, California.
- Vera Colina, M.A. (2006), "Cogestión de empresas y transformación del sistema económico en Venezuela: algunas reflexiones", *Gaceta Laboral*, vol. 12, number 2, viewed on 18 June 2010 [<http://www.scielo.org.ve>].
- Wilpert, G. (2007), *Changing Venezuela By Taking Power*, London, Verso.
- Woods, A. (2005), *The Venezuela Revolution: A Marxist Perspective*, London, Wellred Books.